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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
DO WE KNOW WHO WE ARE BY KNOWING WHO WE ARE NOT?: THE 
EFFECTS OF INCLUDING DISLIKED OTHERS IN THE SELF-CONCEPT 
 
People include other people in their self-concept. Research has examined the 
causes and effects of including liked, but not disliked others into the self-concept. Liked 
others are included because of a motivation to affiliate and get closer to the other person. 
The current investigation examined whether disliked others are included as a result of a 
motivation to differentiate and distinguish oneself from the other person. It also examined 
how self-concept inclusion of disliked others affects self-concept clarity. First, I tested 
whether people include disliked others into their self-concepts by showing a memory bias 
for disliked others similar to that of liked others (Study 1). Liked others, but not disliked 
others or acquaintances, showed this memory bias. Next, I tested whether people were 
motivated to differentiate themselves from disliked others by measuring whether they had 
slower reaction times when characterizing the self with traits similar to those of disliked 
others (Study 2). I did not find this effect. Finally, neither study showed a mediating 
effect of self-concept clarity. These results failed to show support for the hypothesis that 
disliked others are included in the self-concept and that including others in the self affects 
self-concept clarity. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The self-concept is both a dynamic and stable entity. It is a person’s sense of who 
they are, including attributes that describe them as well as objects, roles, and people who 
are important to them (e.g. Markus & Wurf, 1987). Interpersonal context and processes 
play an important role in the self-concept (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). For example, 
people incorporate significant people in their lives into their self-concepts (e.g. Aron, 
Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). A large body of research 
demonstrates that close others are incorporated in the self and such self-other overlap has 
significant cognitive consequences. What has not yet been studied, however, is the role of 
disliked others in the self-concept. Theories of the self indicate that people’s interactions 
with others affect their self-concept (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Markus & Wurf, 
1987). This implies that people’s self-concepts are influenced not only by people they 
like and are close to, but also by people that they dislike.  
  I proposed that disliked others were also included in people’s self-concepts. 
Previous research supports the idea of an affiliation-based motivation for self-concept 
inclusion (e.g. Aron et al., 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009).  People who are liked, 
especially those who are close to us, are incorporated in the self so that we can become 
more like them. I predicted that people also have a distinctiveness-based motivation for 
self-concept inclusion. The current research tested the hypothesis that significant people 
who are disliked are incorporated into the self for the purpose of differentiating ourselves 
from them and this distinctiveness motivation should increase people’s self-concept 
clarity.  
Inclusion of Others in the Self-Concept 
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The self-concept is a dynamic reflection of the social world to which a person 
belongs and the interpersonal relationships they have within that world (e.g. Markus & 
Wurf, 1987). The people that others interact with have a significant impact on their self-
concepts, regardless of whether they are liked or disliked. Early research on the self 
posited that people had as many social selves as they did people who knew them, 
regardless of whether they liked or disliked these people (James, 1890).  
Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) were the first to expand on James’s theory of the 
self. Cooley introduced the concept of the “looking-glass self.” According to this theory, 
a person’s self-concept is not composed of their perceptions of themselves, but instead is 
composed of what they think others think of them (Cooley, 1902). The self-concept arises 
from a person’s interpretation of how others react or how they think others will react to 
him or her (Mead, 1934). To anticipate others’ reactions, people learn to perceive the 
world as others do. This knowledge is incorporated into a person’s sense of self and 
guides their behavior, even in the absence of others (Mead, 1934). According to Mead’s 
theory, people have as many selves as they have social roles. The more important the role 
is, the more important that particular self (Mead, 1934). Given that negative events and 
information have a greater impact on the self than positive ones do (see Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001 for a review), negative roles should be at least as 
important, if not more important, than positive roles. The present research also compared 
the effects of liked and disliked others on the self-concept. 
The social context, especially our interaction partners, play an important role in 
the self-concept. For example, people’s ideas of not only who they are, but also who they 
want to become or fear becoming are incorporated into the self-concept (Markus & 
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Nurius, 1986). These possible selves are the pieces of the self-concept that represent 
hopes, fears, goals, and threats. These possible selves derive from salient categories, 
often based on personal history and experiences (Markus, 1977). Negative relationships 
are a likely candidate for a salient category from which to derive possible selves. People 
who do not want to become or fear becoming like a disliked other should have possible 
selves representing themselves with characteristics of the disliked other. The existence of 
these possible selves may increase people’s desire to differentiate from a disliked other. 
The next section will discuss what impact including others in the self-concept has on it.   
Effects of Including Others in the Self-Concept 
One of the consequences of expanding the self to include others is including the 
identities of that person into the self (Aron & Aron, 1986). Several empirical studies 
demonstrate this effect for liked others. For example, people show better memory for 
words associated with friends than with unknown others (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). 
After constructing sentences with the name of a friend or an unknown other, people 
remembered more of the nouns in the friend versus unknown other sentences on 
unexpected recall tests (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). Self-relevant information, such as 
information about people important to the self, is remembered better than other 
information (see Symons & Johnson, 1997 for a review). Similarly, people show better 
memory for nouns that they previously imagined they or a close other (i.e. their mother) 
interacting with compared to a stranger (i.e. a celebrity) (Aron et al., 1991). People 
remembered as many nouns paired with themselves as nouns paired with their mothers.  
These studies demonstrate that people who are included in the self-concept are 
treated like the self when it comes to recall. I expected the same pattern to be shown for 
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disliked others as for liked others, but through a different mechanism. In the above 
studies, people are including liked others into the self-concept as a result of an affiliation 
motivation. Because they want to get closer to liked others, they include them in their 
self-concept, resulting in superior recognition for liked others. I expected that disliked 
others would be included into the self-concept as a result of a differentiation motivation. 
Because people want to differentiate themselves from disliked others, they include them 
in their self-concept, resulting in superior recognition for disliked others.  
Additional evidence demonstrates that people extend their self-concepts to 
incorporate the attributes of liked others. For example, participants show slower reaction 
times correctly rejecting attributes that are descriptive of the self but not of a close other 
(Aron et al., 1991). The slower reaction times indicate that there is some cognitive 
overlap between the self and other, indicating the inclusion of the other in the self-
concept. Discrepancies between traits that describe one person but not the other produce 
some confusion. People are motivated to be closer to liked others and therefore have a 
more difficult time acknowledging their differences. I predict a similar pattern for 
disliked others; discrepancies between traits that describe both the self as well as a 
disliked other should also produce confusion. If people are motivated to differentiate 
themselves from disliked others, they will have a more difficult time acknowledging their 
similarities. 
The motivation to draw closer to liked others is not due solely to shared 
experience between these individuals. People show the same self-concept inclusion for 
traits that they imagine a liked other having (Slotter & Gardner, 2009). Participants 
imagined a conversation between themselves and their romantic partner or an 
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acquaintance in which the other tells them about an attribute that was important to them. 
This attribute was one that was pre-selected to be not descriptive of the participant or the 
romantic partner. Following the imagined scenario, participants reported greater self-
integration with their partner than with the acquaintance (Slotter & Gardner, 2009). 
Specifically, participants rated the target attribute as more indicative of themselves than 
they had initially. They also took longer to correctly reject the attribute in a reaction time 
task. People are motivated to draw closer to a liked other by integrating information 
relevant to their partner’s sense of self into their own self-concept, even without shared 
experience of this information. A similar process should occur for disliked others.  
Effects of Disliked Others on the Self 
  The available research on disliked others focuses primarily on enemy 
relationships. Although the present research focuses on others that are disliked and it is 
possible to dislike someone without considering them an enemy, an enemy is still a type 
of disliked other. Research on enemies  contributes some insight onto the topic of 
disliked others. Over 70% of adults report having an enemy, or someone who actively 
and intentionally used power to block their goals and inflict harm (Holt, 1989; Wiseman 
& Duck, 1995). Given that the characteristics of an enemy are more stringent than those 
of a disliked other, it is likely that a greater number of people would report knowing at 
least one person they dislike. Some researchers claim that people have a fundamental 
need to have enemies (Barash, 1994; Boyer, 1986; Volkan, 1985). Indeed, the presence of 
enemy relationships is found across cultures. Evidence of enemy relationships was found 
in Ghana as well as in North America (Adams, 2005). Despite the importance of enemy 
relationships, however, very little research has been performed on this topic.  
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Existing research posits that enemyship (or “the perception that another person or 
group is using influence and power to undermine one’s own goals and well-being; 
Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010) serves an important psychological function. 
Specifically, enemies are perceived to be an influential source of misfortune in people’s 
lives. Controlling that misfortune by understanding it minimizes the threat it poses. 
Enemyship allows people to maintain a sense of perceived control over their lives 
because it allows them to identify and understand environmental threat (Sullivan et al., 
2010). Incorporating a disliked other into one’s self-concept should increase 
understanding of the other and the perception of control over them.  
Other research suggests that enemies may be included in the self-concept. The 
development of enemy relationships in children depends on the attainment of a more 
developed self-concept (Bigelow, 1977; Hesse and Mack, 1991). People thus do not 
possess enemies before having a well-developed self-concept, suggesting that the self-
concept plays a crucial role in enemy relationships. Additionally, enemies dominate one 
another’s actions, thoughts, and feelings (Rieber & Kelly, 1991), suggesting that 
cognitive representations of these individuals are close at hand. This parallels what is 
known about including liked others in the self-concept. Research has shown that 
significant other representations are chronically accessible (Andersen, Glassman, Chen, 
& Cole, 1995; Chen, Andersen, & Hinkley, 1999). If representations of both liked and 
disliked others possess a high baseline level of accessibility, it is likely that both are 
included in people’s self-concepts. 
The need to have enemies stems from people’s desire to maintain a favorable self-
image (Boyer, 1986). Incorporating enemies or disliked others into a person’s self-
 7 
concept and distancing oneself from them may allow people to maintain a positive image 
of themselves. As an exploratory hypothesis, I also measured state social self-esteem to 
tap into this mechanism. This process is similar to engaging in downward social 
comparisons. Festinger (1954) hypothesized that people have a unidimensional drive 
upward. That is, the drive to appear more capable than others involves an ego-enhancing 
motive that is better served by making downward comparisons (see Suls, 1977). 
Comparing oneself to less fortunate others enables the self to deduce that it is better off 
than the other. Although less fortunate others aren’t necessarily disliked, comparing 
oneself to disliked others may serve a similar function. Additional research empirically 
studies situations in which downward comparisons are made. Under conditions of threat, 
people responded by making a downward comparison for the purpose of self-
enhancement (Hakmiller, 1966). The presence of disliked other—real, imagined, or 
implied—may serve as a threat. Differentiating oneself from a disliked other that is 
included in the self-concept may serve a similar self-enhancing purpose.  
Recent research shows that one mechanism by which people are motivated to 
include disliked others in the self-concept is romantic jealousy (Slotter, Lucas, Jakubiak, 
& Lasslett, 2013). When people experience romantic jealousy toward a romantic rival, 
they are motivated to change their self-concepts to become more similar to this rival in 
order to keep their partner’s attention. Specifically, the experience of jealousy of a 
romantic rival as well as the perception that their romantic partner was interested in a 
rival predicted increased feelings of similarity to a romantic rival. Experimentally 
induced jealousy also mediated the relationship between perceiving the partner as 
interested in a rival and self-concept change toward the rival (Slotter et al., 2013). 
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My research proposes to show a different mechanism by which people are 
motivated to include disliked others in the self-concept, that is, distinctiveness. Slotter 
and colleagues’ (2013) research shows that in order to keep one’s partner faithful, people 
are willing to change themselves to become more like a disliked other— specifically a 
romantic rival. However, when they do not feel jealousy or think that their partner is 
interested in the rival, they do not show these effects. The effects are limited to situations 
in which people are motivated to become more like the rival. I expected that my research 
will extend that of Slotter and colleagues’ to show that when people are not motivated to 
become similar to disliked others, but instead are motivated to become distinct from 
them, they will include disliked others into the self-concept to differentiate themselves 
from them.  
Effects on Self-Concept Clarity 
 I expected to find that including others into the self-concept would increase self-
concept clarity. Self-concept clarity refers to the extent to which self-knowledge is 
clearly defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable (Campbell et al., 1996). 
Relational selves serve as a sense of clarity about who the self is in relation to others. The 
relational self includes knowledge about the self linked in memory to that of significant 
others. It exists at multiple levels of specificity, is capable of being contextually or 
chronically activated, and is composed of self-aspects that characterize the self when 
relating to significant others (Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006). According to this model, 
the relational self provides the self-regulatory direction that people who lack a clear sense 
of self are missing (Chen et al., 2006). In other words, it improves self-concept clarity. 
Possessing information about who one is in relation to others improves self-concept 
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clarity, while a lack of this information decreases it. Notably, the others can be close, 
liked others or disliked others. Including liked or disliked others in the self-concept 
should thus increase a person’s self-concept clarity. 
Overview of Current Research 
 The present research examined the effects of disliked others on the self. I 
predicted that disliked others would be incorporated into people’s self-concepts. 
Specifically, I predicted that people have improved memory for words associated with 
both liked and disliked others, indicating that both liked and disliked others are 
incorporated into people’s self concepts. I also predicted that people will be faster to 
classify adjectives as self-descriptive or not if the adjective is descriptive of a disliked 
other or not respectively. Finally, I hypothesized that including disliked others in the self-
concept would increase people’s self-concept clarity. Specifically, in both studies, people 
who differentiated themselves from disliked others, but not acquaintances, would show 
increased self-concept clarity. As an exploratory hypothesis, I also measured whether 
people who differentiate themselves from disliked others, but not acquaintances, showed 
increased state social self-esteem. 
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Chapter Two: Study 1 
 In Study 1, I tested the idea that both liked and disliked others are incorporated 
into people’s self-concepts. People show improved memory for concepts associated with 
friends rather than with unknown others (Aron et al., 1991; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). 
Modeling Greenwald and Banaji’s (1989) procedure, Study 1 attempted to replicate this 
effect with both liked and disliked others. I predicted that people would have improved 
memory for concepts associated with both liked and disliked others, but not 
acquaintances. I also predicted that the inclusion of liked and disliked others, but not 
acquaintances, into the self-concept will increase people’s self-concept clarity. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 446 undergraduates (359 female) from the University of 
Kentucky, recruited from the Psychology subject pool. On average, participants were 
19.04 years old, SD = 2.05. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for 
participating in my study.  
Measures 
 Self-Concept Clarity Scale. To assess self-concept clarity, I asked participants to 
complete the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996; See Appendix A). This 
scale is a 12-item measure in which participants rated how much they agreed with several 
statements about themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). These statements assessed how much self-knowledge is clearly and confidently 
defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable. I modified the items in the original 
scale slightly in order to measure state rather than trait levels of self-concept clarity (e.g. 
“At this moment, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.”) This scale 
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demonstrated good reliability, α = .87 for initial self-concept clarity, α = .90 for self-
concept clarity at time 2. 
 State Social Self-Esteem Scale. To assess state social self-esteem, I asked 
participants to complete the social subscale of the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1991; See Appendix B). This subscale is a 7-item measure that assesses 
participants’ social self-esteem at a given point in time. Participants rate how much each 
item is true of themselves at the present time on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 5 
(Extremely) (e.g. “I feel that there are others who respect and admire me.”) This scale 
demonstrated good reliability, α = .88 for initial state social self-esteem, α = .92 for state 
social self-esteem at time 2. 
Sentence-pairing task. Participants wrote 10 sentences, one for each of the 
generated names. Participants were instructed that each sentence should include a specific 
name (identified by number) and assigned noun. Nouns from Greenwald and Banaji’s 
(1989) study were used (See Appendix C). They included names of concrete objects from 
different noun categories. Participants typed their sentences on the computer after being 
given their sheet of names and the target nouns for each. General instructions for the task 
preceded the spaces for the sentences: 
 
“If the task is ‘Create a sentence using name #4 and the word REFRIGERATOR’, 
you should turn to your sheet of names and look up name #4. If name #4 happens 
to be ‘Jones,’ then a suitable sentence might be: 
 Jones spent all Saturday morning repairing the refrigerator. 
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The sentence should be constructed so that the person and object are actively 
involved with one another.”  
Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS). This scale assesses people’s closeness to others 
(Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants were given an image of seven pairs of 
overlapping circles, with varying degrees of overlap. For each person whose name they 
wrote, participants were asked to select one of the seven circles to indicate the degree of 
closeness they currently felt to that person as well as the degree of closeness they wanted 
to feel to that person (See Appendix D). 
Procedure 
 Participants came to the lab expecting to participate in a study about trivia. After 
receiving a description of the study and signing a consent form, participants completed 
the self-concept clarity scale, state self-esteem scale, and other demographic and 
personality questionnaires. Next, they generated the names of 10 people they dislike, 10 
friends, or 10 acquaintances onto a numbered piece of paper. Participants were instructed 
to write 10 sentences, one for each name they wrote, using assigned nouns. Following the 
sentence-pairing task, participants completed the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) scale 
for each of the names they wrote. For each name, participants indicated how close they 
currently feel to that person and how close they want to feel to that person. Next, they 
completed a brief filler task in which they were given a booklet of trivia items and were 
given five minutes to study it.  
 After studying the trivia items, participants were given an unexpected test for 
recall of the nouns, names, and pairs of objects and names. First, they received 
instructions to type as many of the target nouns on the space available on the computer 
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that they remembered. After completing this recall task, participants repeated the same 
task, but for the names of the people they generated earlier. Next, participants were given 
back their original sheet of names and asked to type on the computer the object that had 
been paired with each name in the sentence task. Following these recall tasks, 
participants completed the self-concept clarity scale one more time. Finally, they were 
debriefed, credited, and dismissed. 
Results 
 Before completing any analyses, I removed 108 participants’ data. Of these 
participants, 11 failed one or more control questions (e.g. “Select answer 3 for this 
question”), 15 did not complete the names task correctly (e.g. wrote names from the trivia 
questions instead of names of people they generated earlier), and 94 did not complete the 
noun task correctly (e.g. wrote verbs or other parts of speech instead of nouns, wrote 
names from the trivia questions instead of names of people they generated earlier). 
Although we tried to make the task as comprehensible to participants as possible, both 
through additional written and verbal instructions, a large number of participants still did 
not follow the instructions.  
Manipulation Check 
 I used the IOS measure as a manipulation check. I performed a one-way ANOVA 
on the effect of condition on average actual and desired closeness to the ten people whose 
names the participant wrote (these were averaged to create a composite for each 
participant). There was a significant effect of condition on average actual closeness 
measured by the IOS, F(2, 329) = 302.13, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that 
participants writing about people they liked felt significantly closest to these individuals 
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(M = 4.75, SD = 1.00) compared to acquaintances (M = 2.25, SD = .91), t(330) =  19.7, p 
< .0001, and compared to disliked others (M = 2.03, SD = .86), t(330) = 22.30, p < .0001. 
Participants writing about people who were their acquaintances felt marginally closer to 
these individuals compared to disliked others, t(330) = 1.72, p = .09. 
 There was also a significant effect of condition on average desired closeness 
measured by the IOS, F(2, 329) = 324.80, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that 
participants writing about people they liked wanted to feel significantly closest to these 
individuals (M = 5.61, SD = .98) compared to acquaintances (M = 3.42, SD = 1.27), 
t(330) = 15.31, p < .0001, and compared to disliked others (M = 2.15, SD = .88), t(330) = 
25.24, p < .0001. Participants writing about people who were their acquaintances also 
wanted to t(330) = 8.94, feel significantly closer to these individuals compared to disliked 
others, p < .0001. Overall, participants’ actual and desired closeness to the target 
individuals matched the condition they were assigned to (See Figure 2.1). 
Memory for Names 
The names of liked and disliked others should be included in participants’ self-
concepts whereas the names of acquaintances should not. Thus, I expected to see 
increased cognitive processing for information associated with liked and disliked others, 
but not for acquaintances. A one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether 
participants’ recall of names was better when they were names of liked others, disliked 
others, or acquaintances. I predicted to find a main effect of person type. I expected that 
planned comparisons would indicate that participants will recall more names of disliked 
others compared to acquaintances, that participants will recall more names of liked others  
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Figure 2.1. Effect of Condition on Average Actual and Desired Closeness to Targets in 
Study 1. 
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compared to acquaintances, and that participants will recall no more target nouns paired 
with liked others versus disliked others.  
 A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 330) = 
27.54, p<.0001. Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the liked condition (M 
= 9.81, SD = .44) remembered significantly more names than participants in either the 
disliked (M = 9.08, SD = 1.00), t(329) = 6.66 p < .0001, or acquaintance (M = 9.11, SD = 
.98), t(329) = 6.09, p = .001 conditions. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance 
conditions did not differ from each other, t(329) = .26, p = .76 (See Figure 2.2). 
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Names 
I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of self-
concept clarity on the relationship between person type and target name recall, 
controlling for initial levels of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.3). Specifically, I 
expected to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the effects of person type on 
target name recall. Because my data included a polytomous categorical independent 
variable with a continuous moderator, it was impossible to use the bootstrapping method 
or to use an ANOVA. Instead, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a 
Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between the liked and 
the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created 
dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.  
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept 
clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked 
variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = 1.05, 
p =.29. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict self- 
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Figure 2.2. Effect of Condition on Memory for Names and Free and Paired Recall 
Nouns. 
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Figure 2.3. Model of the Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on the Relationship 
between Condition and Recall. 
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concept clarity at time 2, B = .02, t(332) = .69, p =.49. For the b path, I tested the effects 
of self-concept clarity at time 2 on names recalled, controlling for initial self-concept 
clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of names 
recalled, B = -.93, t(331) = -.95, p = .34. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of 
dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. 
The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, B = -.73, 
t(332) = -6.62, p <.0001. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly 
predicted names recalled, B = -.69, t(332) = -6.02, p <.0001. Finally, for the c’ path, I 
tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial 
self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable 
significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-
concept clarity at time 2, B = -.73, t(322) = -6.56, p <.0001. The dummy coded 
acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial 
self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, B = -.69, t(332) = -5.98, p <.0001. 
Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant 
mediation. 
Mediating Effects of Social State Self-Esteem on Memory for Names 
As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social 
self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social 
self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory 
for names. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and 
conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between  
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Figure 2.4. Model of the Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on the 
Relationship between Condition and Recall. 
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the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and 
created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.  
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social 
self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded 
disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B =-.09, 
t(332) = -1.32, p =.19. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly 
predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B = .06, t(332) = .84, p =.40. For the b path, I 
tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on names recalled, controlling for 
initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not predict number of 
names recalled, B = -.07, t(333) = -.67, p = .0.51 Next, for the c path, I tested the effects 
of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. 
The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, B = -.73, 
t(332) = -6.64, p <.0001. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly 
predicted names recalled, B = -.70, t(332) = -6.08, p <.0001. Finally, for the c’ path, I 
tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial 
state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked 
variable significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial state social self-
esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = -.74, t(332) = -6.68, p <.0001,. The 
dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled, 
controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = -
.69, t(332) = -6.03, p <.0001. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do 
not have significant mediation. 
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Memory for Free-Recall Nouns 
A second one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether participants’ free recall 
of nouns was better when those nouns had been associated with liked and disliked others 
rather than acquaintances. I predict to find a main effect of condition. I also predicted to 
find a main effect of person type, in which planned comparisons would indicate that 
participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with disliked others compared 
to acquaintances, that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with 
liked others compared to unknown others, and that participants will recall no more target 
nouns paired with liked others versus disliked others.  
 A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 327) = 
6.22, p =.002 (See Figure 2.2). Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the 
liked condition (M = 7.37, SD = 2.36) remembered significantly more names than 
participants in the disliked (M = 6.35, SD = 2.27), t(326) = 3.52, p =.001, and marginally 
more names than participants in the acquaintance (M = 6.80, SD = 1.94), t(326) = 1.87, p 
= .06 condition. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance conditions did not differ 
from each other, t(326) = 1.49, p = .18. 
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Free Recall Nouns 
I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of self-
concept clarity on the relationship between person type and noun free-recall (See Figure 
2.3). Specifically, I expect to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the effects 
of person type on name free recall. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my 
independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found 
significant or marginally significant differences only between the liked and the other two 
 23 
groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for 
the disliked and acquaintance group.  
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept 
clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked 
variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = 1.05, 
p =.29. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict self-
concept clarity at time 2, B = .02, t(332) = .69, p =.49. For the b path, I tested the effects 
of self-concept clarity at time 2 on free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-
concept clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of free-
recall nouns recalled, B = -.15, t(332) = -.30, p = .77. Next, for the c path, I tested the 
effects of dummy-coded condition on memory of free-recall nouns, controlling for initial 
self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted free-
recall nouns recalled, B = -1.02, t(329) = -3.50, p =.001. The dummy coded acquaintance 
variable marginally predicted free-recall nouns recalled, B = -.56, t(329) = -1.83, p =.07. 
Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on free-recall noun 
recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2. The 
dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted free-recall nouns recalled, 
controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, B = -1.01, 
t(329) = -3.47, p =.001. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted 
free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept 
clarity at time 2, B = -.55, t(329) = -1.81, p =.07. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths 
were significant, I do not have significant mediation. 
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Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on Memory for Free Recall Nouns 
As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social 
self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social 
self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory 
for names. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and 
conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between 
the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and 
created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.  
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social 
self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded 
disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B =-.09, 
t(332) = -1.32, p =.19. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly 
predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B = .06, t(332) = .84, p =.40. For the b path, I 
tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on free-recall nouns recalled, 
controlling for initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not 
significantly predict the number of free-recall nouns recalled, B = .30, t(334) = 1.31, p = 
.19. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on noun free 
recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable 
significantly predicted nouns free recalled, B = -1.02, t(329) = -3.51, p =.001. The 
dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted names recalled, B = -.56, 
t(329) = -1.83, p =.07. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded 
condition on target name recall, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state 
social self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted 
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nouns free recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-
esteem at time 2, B = -1.00, t(329) = -3.44, p =.001. The dummy coded acquaintance 
variable marginally predicted nouns free recalled, controlling for initial state social self-
esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = -.57, t(329) = -1.86, p =.06. Thus, 
because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation. 
Memory for Paired-Recall Nouns 
A third one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether participants’ paired recall 
of nouns was better when those nouns had been associated with liked and disliked others 
rather than acquaintances. I predict to find a main effect of condition. I predicted to find a 
main effect of person type, in which planned comparisons would indicate that 
participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with disliked others compared 
to acquaintances, that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with 
liked others compared to acquaintances, and that participants will recall no more target 
nouns paired with liked others versus disliked others.  
 A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 329) = 
4.25, p =.02 (See Figure 2.2). Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the liked 
condition (M = 7.69, SD = 2.28) remembered significantly more paired recall nouns than 
participants in the disliked (M = 6.91, SD = 2.20), t(328) = 2.66, p =.01, and marginally 
more names than participants in the acquaintance (M = 6.97, SD = 2.24), t(328) = 2.34, p 
= .02 condition. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance conditions did not differ 
from each other, t(328) = .21, p = .83. 
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Paired Recall Nouns 
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I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of self-
concept clarity on the relationship between person type and noun paired-recall (See 
Figure 2.3). Specifically, I expect to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the 
relationship between person type on noun paired-recall. For the same reasons as above, I 
dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. 
Because I found significant or marginally significant differences only between the liked 
condition and the other two conditions, I used the liked category as my comparison group 
and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.  
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept 
clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked 
variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = 1.05, 
p =.29. The dummy coded acquaintance variable did not significantly predict self-concept 
clarity at time 2, B = .03, t(332) = .69, p =.49. For the b path, I tested the effects of self-
concept clarity at time 2 on paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-
concept clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of 
paired-recall nouns recalled, B = -.26, t(336) = -.53, p = .59. Next, for the c path, I tested 
the effects of dummy-coded condition on memory of paired-recall nouns, controlling for 
initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted 
paired-recall nouns recalled, B = -.78, t(331) = -2.64, p =.01. The dummy coded 
acquaintance variable also significantly predicted paired-recall nouns recalled, B = -.71, 
t(331) = -2.30, p =.02. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded 
condition on paired-recall noun recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-
concept clarity at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted 
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paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept 
clarity at time 2, B = -.77, t(331) = -2.59, p =.01,. The dummy coded acquaintance 
variable marginally predicted paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-
concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, B = -.70, t(331) = -2.27, p =.02. Thus, 
because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation. 
Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on Memory for Paired Recall Nouns 
As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social 
self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social 
self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory 
for paired recall nouns. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent 
variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences 
only between the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my 
comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.  
First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social 
self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded 
disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B =-.09, 
t(332) = -1.32, p =.19. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly 
predict state social self-esteem at time 2, B = .06, t(332) = .84, p =.40. For the b path, I 
tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on paired-recall nouns recalled, 
controlling for initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not 
significantly predict the number of paired-recall nouns recalled, B = .13, t(336) = .54, p = 
.59. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on noun paired 
recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable 
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significantly predicted nouns pair recalled, B = -.78, t(331) = -2.65, p <.01. The dummy 
coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted paired nouns recalled, B = -.72, t(331) 
= -2.65, p =.02. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on 
paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social 
self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted nouns 
paired recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem 
at time 2, B = -.78, t(331) = -2.63, p <.01,. The dummy coded acquaintance variable 
marginally predicted nouns paired recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem 
and state social self-esteem at time 2, B = -.72, t(331) = -2.34, p =.02. Thus, because only 
the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation. 
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Chapter Three: Study 2  
Study 2 was designed to extend Study 1 by examining the effects of including 
disliked others into the self-concept. Specifically, I predicted that people will emphasize 
their distinctiveness with the disliked other such that people will be faster to classify a 
trait as self-descriptive if it is not descriptive of the other and as not self-descriptive if it 
is descriptive of the other. I also predicted that emphasizing distinctiveness with the 
disliked other will increase people’s self-concept clarity, but performing a similar task 
with an acquaintance will not. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 237 undergraduates (208 female) from the University of 
Kentucky, recruited from the Psychology subject pool. On average, participants were 
19.06 years old, SD = 2.65. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for 
participating in my study.  
Measures 
 Self-Concept Clarity. Participants completed the Self-Concept Clarity Scale as in 
Study 1. This scale demonstrated good reliability, α = .87 for initial self-concept clarity, 
α = .90 for self-concept clarity at time 2. 
 State Social Self-Esteem. Participants completed the social subscale of the State 
Self-Esteem Scale as in Study 1. This scale demonstrated good reliability, α = .84 for 
initial state social self-esteem, α = .89 for state social self-esteem at time 2. 
Inclusion of Other in Self. Participants completed the Inclusion of Other in the 
Self Scale as in Study 1.  
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Trait Adjective Rating Task. Participants rated how much each of 90 traits applied 
to themselves and a disliked other, a liked other, or an acquaintance. These traits were the 
same as those used in Aron and colleagues’ (1991) study (See Appendix E). They 
included traits that were previously rated as likeable, dislikeable, or neutral. They rated 
each item on a scale from 1 (extremely like the target person) to 7 (extremely unlike the 
target person). Participants will rate all traits for each person (i.e. self or other) at a time, 
before moving on to the next person.  
 Me/Not Me Reaction Time Task. Participants completed a reaction time task on 
the computer in which they were presented with a series of adjectives (as in Aron et al., 
1991). They were instructed to decide as quickly as possible for each one whether it was 
descriptive (“me”) or not descriptive (“not me”) of them. Participants indicated whether 
or not the trait was descriptive of them based on which key they pressed on the keyboard. 
They were told to press E for “me” and I for “not me.” The adjective appeared on the 
screen and remained there until the subject pressed one of the keys. The amount of time a 
participant took to select one of the keys as well as which key was selected was recorded. 
The adjectives that were presented to participants were the same set of 90 adjectives used 
earlier. The set was presented two times in different random orders each time.  
Procedure 
 Participants came to the laboratory ostensibly for an experiment about personality 
and reaction times. The experimenter informed the participant what the experiment was 
about and had them read and sign an informed consent form. First, participants completed 
the self-concept clarity and state self-esteem scales as well as some other demographic 
and personality questionnaires. Next, they completed the adjective-rating task. In this 
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task, participants completed a questionnaire in which they rated 90 trait adjectives in 
terms of how much they applied to themselves and a disliked other, a liked other, or an 
acquaintance. They then completed the IOS for the disliked other, liked other, or the 
acquaintance, indicating how close they felt and wanted to feel to that individual. 
Afterwards, participants completed the Me/Not Me reaction time task. In this task, they 
indicated whether the same adjectives are self-descriptive or not as fast as they could. 
Finally, participants once again completed the self-concept clarity scale. Following this 
task, participants were debriefed, credited, and dismissed.  
Results 
Before doing any analyses, I removed the data of 14 participants, leaving me with 
a total of 223. The participants whose data I removed failed one or more of three control 
questions (e.g. “Select answer 3 for this question”). 
Manipulation Check 
 I used the IOS measure as a manipulation check. I performed a one-way ANOVA 
on the effect of condition on average actual and desired closeness to the other. There was 
a significant effect of condition on average actual closeness measured by the IOS, F(2, 
219) = 140.22, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that participants describing 
attributes of people they liked felt significantly closest to these individuals (M = 5.82, SD 
= 1.21) compared to acquaintances (M = 2.48, SD = 1.20), t(218) = 14.62, p < .0001, and 
compared to disliked others (M = 2.21, SD = 1.53), t(218) = 15.81, p < .0001. Participants 
writing about people who were their acquaintances did not feel significantly closer to 
these individuals compared to disliked others, t(218) = 1.33, p = .18. 
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 There was also a significant effect of condition on average desired closeness 
measured by the IOS, F(2, 219) = 98.17, p < .0001. Planned contrasts indicated that 
participants describing attributes of people they liked wanted to feel significantly closest 
to these individuals (M = 6.14, SD = 1.11) compared to acquaintances (M = 4.11, SD = 
1.56), t(218) = 7.19, p < .0001, and compared to disliked others (M = 2.12, SD = 1.90), 
t(218) = 13.92, p < .0001. Participants describing attributes of people who were their 
acquaintances also wanted to feel significantly closer to these individuals compared to 
disliked others, t(218) = 7.94, p < .0001. Although participants’ actual closeness to the 
acquaintances and disliked others did not significantly differ, they did desire to be 
significantly closer to the acquaintance than the disliked other. This pattern of results 
suggests that participants’ actual and desired closeness to the target individuals matched 
the condition they were assigned to (See Figure 3.1). 
Pre-analysis coding 
Adjective ratings were divided such that those with ratings of 5 or higher were 
considered descriptive of the target person and those with ratings of 3 or lower were 
considered not descriptive of the target person. Adjective ratings of 4, the midpoint of the 
scale, were not considered given that this would indicate that the adjective was neither 
descriptive nor not descriptive of the target person. The adjectives were next divided into 
categories for each subject according to their pattern for the three target people. Response 
times were averaged based on category.  
There were three possible combinations of descriptive and not-descriptive traits of 
each of the two people: traits descriptive of both the self and other (disliked other, liked 
other, or acquaintance), traits descriptive of the self but not of the other, and traits not  
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Figure 3.1. Effect of Condition on Actual and Desired Closeness to Target in Study 2. 
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descriptive of self but descriptive of the other. I did not find any differences between the 
second two categories. I thus collapsed them into one category. This left us with two 
categories: traits descriptive of both the self and other and traits descriptive of either the 
self or the other.  
Effects of Condition and Attribute Type on Reaction Time 
 Before doing any analyses, I also corrected for extreme reaction times (i.e. 
reaction times likely to be errors rather than real reaction times). Extreme times were 
defined as times faster than 300 ms or slower than 3000 ms. These times were replaced 
with those boundary limits (e.g. any time faster than 300 ms was re-coded as 300 ms) 
(e.g. Greenwald, McGee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).  
A 2 (descriptive of self and other vs. descriptive of self or other) x 3 
(acquaintance vs. disliked other vs. liked other) repeated measures analysis of variance 
was conducted on the reaction times. I expected to find a significant interaction. I 
expected that participants would classify adjectives more slowly when they were 
descriptive of themselves and (rather than or) the disliked other, but that participants 
would classify adjectives more slowly when they were descriptive of themselves or 
(rather than and) the liked other. I did not expect any difference among classification 
speed based on category for the acquaintance however. 
I found a significant interaction between attribute type and condition, F(2, 182) = 
5.40, p < .01 (See Figure 3.2). To probe this interaction, I examined the effects of 
condition on reaction time when attributes were one of two different types (descriptive of 
both self and other vs. descriptive of self or other). First I examined the effects of 
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Figure 3.2. Interaction between Condition and Attribute Type on Reaction Time. 
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condition on reaction time for attributes descriptive of both the self and the other. I found 
no significant differences in reaction times between the disliked (M = 1074.08, SD = 
256.59) and acquaintance (M = 1062.33, SD = 249.64) conditions, F(1, 205) = .13, p = 
.72. There was also no significant difference in reaction times between the acquaintance 
and liked (M = 1031.06, SD = 180.94) conditions, F(1, 205) = 1.53, p = .22. Finally, there 
was no difference between the liked and disliked conditions, F(1, 205) = 2.28, p = .13. 
For the attributes descriptive of both the self and the other, there were no differences 
between conditions. 
Next, I examined the effects of condition on reaction time for attributes 
descriptive of either the self or the other. I found a marginally significant difference in 
reaction times between the disliked (M = 1062.97, SD = 198.01) and acquaintance (M = 
1125.21, SD = 278.56) conditions, F(1, 190) = 3.15, p = .08. There was no significant 
difference in reaction times between the acquaintance and liked (M = 1160.40, SD = 
243.47) conditions, F(1, 190) = .14, p = .71. Finally, I found a marginally significant 
difference in reaction times between the liked and disliked conditions, F(1, 190) = 3.68, p 
= .06. 
Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity 
 I initially planned to conduct a moderated mediation analysis to test the mediating 
effects of self-concept clarity on the interaction between descriptive type and person type 
on reaction time. However, because one of the independent variables was a repeated 
measures variable and the mediator was not, it was impossible to conduct this analysis. 
Given that the moderation did not work out as I predicted, even if I was able to do this 
analysis, interpreting it would be challenging. 
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Effects of Condition and Attribute Type on Response Errors 
I conducted a 2 (descriptive of self and other vs. descriptive of self or other) x 3 
(acquaintance vs. disliked other vs. liked other) repeated measures analysis of variance on 
the response errors. Recall that a response error was classified as an attribute rated by 
participants as descriptive of them in the attribute-rating task but not descriptive of them 
in the reaction time task or the reverse. I expected to find a significant interaction. I 
expected that participants would make more response errors for attributes descriptive of 
themselves and (rather than or) the disliked other, but that participants would make more 
response errors when they were descriptive of themselves or (rather than and) the liked 
other. I did not expect any difference among number of response errors based on category 
for the acquaintance however. 
The interaction was not significant, F(2, 195) = 2.04, p = .13 (see Figure 3.3). The 
number of response errors made by participants in the disliked condition (M = 3.31, SD = 
3.99 for attributes descriptive of self and other; M = 3.56, SD = 2.53 for attributes 
descriptive of self or other) did not significantly differ from the number of response 
errors made by participants in the acquaintance condition (M = 2.55, SD = 3.65 for 
attributes descriptive of self and other; M = 3.62, SD = 2.94 for attributes descriptive of 
self or other) nor the liked condition (M = 3.35, SD = 3.94 for attributes descriptive of 
self and other; M = 3.05, SD = 2.20 for attributes descriptive of self or other). 
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Figure 3.3. Interaction between Condition and Attribute Type on Response Errors. 
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
The self-concept is inherently socially based. People’s self-concepts significantly 
impact how they interact with others. In turn, others significantly impact our self-
concepts. Other people are thus a fundamental part of our self-concepts. Indeed, previous 
research suggests that people extend their selves to incorporate close others into their 
self-concepts (e.g. Aron et al., 1991). Such self-expansion involves self-other overlap. 
People are motivated to draw closer to liked others and in doing so, they take on their 
attributes (Aron et al., 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). The current research tested 
whether disliked others are incorporated into the self-concept and what the implications 
are. I proposed that people would show the same memory bias for disliked as for liked 
others and that people would be motivated to be distinct from disliked others, as 
evidenced by faster reaction times for traits not descriptive of the self but descriptive of 
the other. I also proposed that including disliked others into the self-concept would 
increase people’s self-concept clarity. 
Two studies, using multiple measures and methods, failed to show support for this 
hypothesis. Study 1 showed that liked others, but not disliked others or acquaintances, are 
included in the self-concept. The self-concept inclusion for liked others was evidenced by 
a memory bias for words associated with liked others compared to acquaintances and 
compared to disliked others. The same bias was not shown for disliked others or 
acquaintances. I tested whether including liked others in the self-concept increased 
people’s self-concept clarity or state social self-esteem by testing for moderated 
mediation. There was no significant mediating effect of either self-concept clarity or state 
social self-esteem. 
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 Study 2 attempted to show that people enhance their distinctiveness from disliked 
others by correctly classifying traits more quickly and making more response errors when 
they are different from the disliked other on that trait. I also expected to replicate Aron 
and colleagues’ (1991) effect that people enhance their similarity to liked others by 
correctly classifying traits when they are different from the liked other on that trait and 
more slowly classifying traits when they are similar from the liked other on that trait 
more quickly. My analyses did not support either of these predictions. There were no 
differences between participants’ reaction times on classifying attributes that were 
descriptive of the self or the other or that were descriptive of the self and the other based 
on what condition they were in. There were also no differences between participants’ 
response errors on classifying attributes that were descriptive of the self or the other or 
that were descriptive of the self and the other based on what condition they were in.  
This research suggests that affect may be important in determining what types of 
people are included in the self-concept. The determining factor of whether someone is 
included in the self-concept appears not to be their level of significance to the person, but 
the nature of their relationship toward this person. Previous research demonstrates that 
liked others are incorporated into the self-concept through an affiliation-based 
motivation. People are motivated to become more similar to liked others (e.g. Aron et al., 
1991; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). As a result, they engage in a 
variety of cognitions and behaviors that involve drawing closer to them. The present 
studies partially replicated previous research showing that liked others are included in the 
self-concept. Names of and nouns associated with liked others were remembered better 
than names of and nouns associated with disliked others or acquaintances. However, 
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unlike previous research, participants in the liked other condition were not any faster in 
classifying attributes associated with the self and other compared to the self or other and 
participants in the acquaintance and disliked other conditions. It is possible that 
participants in the acquaintance and disliked conditions were not as certain of the 
attributes of their acquaintances and disliked others as participants in the liked other 
condition were. Unfortunately I did not ask participants’ about their knowledge of 
acquaintances’ and disliked others’ traits, so there is no way of knowing whether this is 
the case. If participants were less certain of acquaintances and disliked others’ traits, it 
could be one of the driving forces behind the absence of this effect. More broadly, the 
results of this research suggest that perhaps affect does matter and negative information is 
not incorporated into the self-concept.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are several limitations that may serve as avenues for further research. First, 
there was a lot of data that had to be excluded from the analysis. In Study 1, 108 
participants’ data was unusable because participants did not follow instructions. Although 
the instructions were written clearly and the experimenters explained the tasks in detail as 
per Greenwald & Banaji’s original study (1989), a large number of participants either still 
did not understand the tasks or did not take them seriously. I further clarified the task 
instructions in the middle of the study when it was clear participants were 
misunderstanding them, but this did not seem to help. For example, it was clear that about 
15 participants did not understand what a noun was and instead identified verbs or other 
words when asked to report nouns. Many more participants gave nouns or names 
associated with the earlier trivia task or associated with neither task rather than the ones 
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associated with the earlier name-generating activity as they were instructed to do. 
Because I had a very large sample size to begin with, I do not think power was an issue in 
my analyses. However, there may have been other participants who were not paying 
attention or taking the task seriously. 
 Next, it is possible that the relationship to the disliked other is a moderating factor 
in whether or not this person is incorporated in the self-concept. Slotter and colleagues’ 
(2013) research suggests that when a person is motivated to incorporate aspects of a 
disliked other (i.e. romantic rival) in the self-self-concept for the purposes of mate-
retention, they will do so. However, when a person lacks this motivation, they do not 
show the same effect. Perhaps people are only motivated to incorporate certain types of 
disliked others in order to differentiate themselves from this person. Future research 
could investigate the moderating role of types of disliked others on self-concept 
inclusion. For example, would people be more likely to include a romantic partner’s ex-
partners in their self-concept for the purpose of distinguishing themselves from these 
people for a similar mate-retention purpose? 
 Finally, although participants were able to come up with disliked others to think 
about while completing the studies, many had difficulty coming up with 10 (in Study 1). 
It could be that the disliked others that participants listed were not very important to them 
in general. If the disliked others were not significant figures in participants’ lives, it is 
likely they would not be included in the self-concept, just as liked others who are not 
significant figures in participants’ lives are not.  
Enemies do not play a prominent role in the lives of people in America in general 
(e.g. Adams, 2005). Contrastingly, enemyship is “built into everyday worlds” as a 
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cultural norm in West African societies (Adams, 2005). This difference is attributed to 
cultural differences in the self-concept, specifically independent versus interdependent 
selves. People in West African societies have interdependent selves, that is selves that are 
defined more in terms of their relationships with others, whereas people in the U.S. have 
independent selves, selves that are defined more in terms of their internal attributes 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Because of this, enemies or disliked others play a more 
significant role in the lives of people with interdependent self-concepts.  Future research 
would benefit from replicating these studies using participants from a society with 
interdependent self-concepts, where disliked others are more likely to play a significant 
role in people’s lives and thus more likely to be included in the self-concept. 
Concluding Remarks 
 Preliminary research shows that disliked others are not included in the self-
concept. It could be that they do not play a significant enough role in people’s lives to be 
included in their self-concepts or that affect matters when determining whether or not 
people or other information is included in the self-concept. Additionally, including others 
into the self-concept does not increase a person’s self-concept clarity or their state social 
self-esteem. People do not know who they are by knowing who they are not. 
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Appendix A 
Self-Concept Clarity Scale 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items on a scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)" 
 
1. RIGHT NOW, my beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.* 
2. RIGHT NOW, on one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I 
might have a different opinion.* 
3. RIGHT NOW, I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am.* 
4. RIGHT NOW, I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.* 
5. RIGHT NOW, when I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not 
sure what I was really like.* 
6. RIGHT NOW, I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my 
personality. 
7. RIGHT NOW, I think I know other people better than I know myself. * 
8. RIGHT NOW, my beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.* 
9. RIGHT NOW, if I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up 
being different from one day to another day.* 
10. RIGHT NOW, even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm really 
like.* 
11. RIGHT NOW, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am. 
12. RIGHT NOW, it is hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't 
really know what I want.* 
 
* Indicates reverse-keyed item. 
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Appendix B 
State Social Self-Esteem 
 
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There 
is, of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true 
of yourself at this moment, be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain 
of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW 
using the scale below: 
 
1   2    3      4        5         6           7 
(not at all)                           (somewhat)        (extremely) 
 
1) RIGHT NOW, I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure 
2) RIGHT NOW, I feel self-conscious 
3) RIGHT NOW, I feel displeased with myself 
4) RIGHT NOW, I am worried about what other people think of me 
5) RIGHT NOW, I feel inferior to others at this moment 
6) RIGHT NOW, I feel concerned about the impression that I am making 
7) RIGHT NOW, I am worried about looking foolish 
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Appendix C 
Nouns Used in Sentence-Writing Task 
BROCCOLI 
HOCKEY 
PUZZLES 
DESK 
TOMATO 
RULER 
VAN 
SHOES 
EAGLE 
ARROW 
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Appendix D 
Inclusion of Other in Self Scale 
We would like to ask you a few questions about your feelings of closeness to person #1-
10. Please use the following picture to answer the questions below. 
 
Please select a number, corresponding to the circles below, that represents how close you 
CURRENTLY feel to person #1-10. 
Please select a number, corresponding to the circles below, that represents how close you 
WANT to feel to person #1-10. 
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Appendix E 
List of 90 Traits used in Aron et al.’s (1991) original study and in Study 2 
 ACTIVE 
 AGGRESSIVE 
 ALERT 
 AMBITIOUS 
 AMUSING 
 ANTISOCIAL 
 APPRECIATIVE 
 ARGUMENTATIVE 
 ATTENTIVE 
 BLUNT 
 BOASTFUL 
 CHEERFUL 
 CHOOSY 
 COLD 
 CONGENIAL 
 CONSIDERATE 
 CORDIAL 
 COWARDLY 
 CREATIVE 
 CRUDE 
 DECEPTIVE 
 DOMINEERING 
 DULL 
 EMOTIONAL 
 ENVIOUS 
 FOOLHARDY 
 FOOLISH 
 FORWARD 
 FRANK 
 GENEROUS 
 GOOD-TEMPERED 
 HOT-HEADED 
 ILL-MANNERED 
 INDEPENDENT 
 INVENTIVE 
 IRRATIONAL 
 IRRITABLE 
 JEALOUS 
 LAZY 
 MATERIALISTIC 
 MATURE 
 METHODICAL 
 NAIVE 
 NEAT 
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 NONCHALANT 
 NOSEY 
 OBJECTIVE 
 OBSERVANT 
 OPPORTUNIST 
 PERSISTENT 
 PERSUASIVE 
 PREJUDICED 
 PRODUCTIVE 
 PROMPT 
 PROUD 
 RESPONSIBLE 
 RESTLESS 
 SARCASTIC 
 SCORNFUL 
 SELF-CENTERED 
 SELF-RELIANT 
 SELF-RIGHTEOUS 
 SENSIBLE 
 SERIOUS 
 SHOWY 
 SHREWD 
 SHY 
 SKEPTICAL 
 SOPHISTICATED 
 SPENDTHRIFT 
 SPITEFUL 
 SUBMISSIVE 
 SUPERFICIAL 
 SUSPICIOUS 
 SYMPATHETIC 
 SYSTEMATIC 
 TACTFUL 
 TACTLESS 
 TENDER 
 TIMID 
 TOLERANT 
 TRUSTING 
 UNFAIR 
 UNPREDICTABLE 
 UNRELIABLE 
 VAIN 
 VERSATILE 
 WEAK 
 WORDY 
 WORRIER 
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